Selectionist theory in psychology conceptualizes behavior as a dynamic phenomenon subject to a variation and selection process similar to that characterizing biological evolution. Though not formally recognized as a dominant psychological metatheory, selectionist thought can be identified in the writings of many of the discipline's eminent scholars. Although selectionism may possess considerable promise as a unifying theory, its widespread acceptance has likely been impeded by the large sample, null hypothesis testing research deSigns associated with the Fisherian tradition.
Whatever other ills may currently beset scientific psychology, considerable recent attention has been drawn to the discipline's conspicuous lack of a metatheory or unifying world view (Green, 1992; Kukla, 1992; Kunkel, 1992; McGartland & Polgar, 1994; McNally, 1992; Schneider, 1992; Staats, 1981 Staats, , 1991 Staats & Mos, 1987) . We are, in the opinion of some, a preparadigmatic discipline, boasting a fragmented and incoherent collection of research procedures, theoretical orientations, and empirical databases. So long as this condition persists, we are unlikely, so the argument goes, to join that pantheon of respected scientific disciplines (e.g., physics, chemistry, biology) whose basic research programs command both respect and support, and whose resulting technologies have influenced the human community in unquestionable ways. In a Kuhnian (1970) sense, psychology, as viewed by these contemporary writers, has a rather formidable obstacle to overcome before achieving the kind of reputation enjoyed by the natural sciences.
Whether psychology is indeed in "crisis," lacking a truly unifying theory, is a contentious matter on which informed opinions are divided. A crisis, however, is hardly necessary to justify efforts at integration. The variability characterizing psychology's empirical and theoretical practices is problematiC even under less than desperate circumstances. In the information age, we can little afford to "rediscover the wheel," an event made all the more likely when researchers avail themselves of different techniques and vocabularies to circumscribe what might be equivalent behavioral phenomena. Lack of consensus on these matters renders difficult the task of documenting the cumulative nature of our knowledge, not to mention the potential prospects for application. In short, whether of calamitous proportions or not, the theoretical disunity characterizing modem psychology is worthy not only of serious dialogue, but attempts to bring about reconciliations or convergence where possible.
The purpose of the present paper is not to argue the relative merits or shortcomings of the claim that psychology is preparadigmatic, but to entertain a possible source of convergence, namely, a generic explanatory framework which, for present purposes, will be referred to as "selectionist theory." In addition, the thesis will be entertained that psychology's reluctance to embrace selectionist thinking, despite such proposals by many of the discipline's most distinguished scholars, can be traced in large part to inadequacies in the standard methods of psychological science.
Fundamentals of a Selection Theory
The phrase "selection theory" may be said to apply to a generic process, though it is perhaps most recognizable within the biological sciences where the reference is to natural selection, the mechanism generally agreed to be responsible for biological evolution. As Mayr (1970) has stated:
The theory of evolution is quite rightly called the greatest unifying theory in biology. The diversity of organisms, similarities and differences between kinds of organisms, patterns of distribution and behavior, adaptation and interpretation, all of this was merely a bewildering chaos of facts until given meaning by the evolutionary theory. (p. 1) There are, of course, differing versions of how, precisely, this process unfolds, just as there are, in psychology, competing theories of learning. Regardless of whether one holds a principally Darwinian view of evolution as a slow process of gradual, small changes, or a view, more recently articulated, that evolutionary change periodically occurs abruptly, in rapid stops and starts (Eldredge & Gould, 1972) , evolutionary accounts invariably invoke the processes of genetic variation and selection as the mechanisms of primacy.
Because genotypic variability is the raw material upon which selection operates, much attention has been devoted to understanding the sources of this variability. Variations in any local gene pool are brought about through two processes, sexual recombination and mutation. Sexual recombination is a remarkably proficient method of stirring up genetic material, a fact which, at least to the biologist, readily accounts for the predominance of this means of reproduction in the biological world. Mutations, spontaneous changes in genetic material, occur with considerable frequency, and although their quasi-random nature renders them predominantly deleterious, one would anticipate that such a stochastic process would occasionally result in adaptive morphological changes.
The constructive process, selection, is the fact that these varying genotypes are differentially reproduced. Those individual organisms who best meet the demands of the local ecology are more likely to reach an age of reproductive maturity, thus passing their genes on to successive generations. It is in this sense that environmental pressures are said to "select" the most adaptive or fit genotypes. It is important to remember, however, that "fitness" is a term defined by local conditions, not a singular, optimal criterion. Thus, "selection theory" alludes generally to the process by which certain variations, genotypically defined in the case of biological evolution, become selected for in a population over time. It is the combined operation of genetic variation and natural selection that has, over the course of millions of years, created the biodiversity celebrated by scientists and nonscientists alike.
It is perhaps understandable, in an age marked by scientific specialization, that psychologists do not, as a matter of course, integrate concepts from the biological sciences into their theoretical and empirical work. Nevertheless, exceptions to this scientific parochialism have become increasingly common. One noteworthy example is the recent growth of evolutionary psychology, a perspective explicitly devoted to understanding current behavioral capacities as adaptations selected for in ancestral populations (see, e.g., Crawford, 1989; Crawford & Anderson, 1989) . In particular, Cosmides and Tooby (1989) suggest that many cognitive functions, such as those regulating social exchange, had to have been selected for during our evolution as a social species.
Similarly, the field of sociobiology (Barash, 1982; Wilson, 1975) has as its self-proclaimed domain the study of evolving sociality, in humans and non humans, by means of natural selection. SOCiobiologists offer fascinating, and often controversial, explanations for such diverse social phenomena as social exchange, mate selection, aggression, child rearing, and altruism. Being a biological theory, sociobiology necessarily operates at a level of analysis quite different from that of most psychological theory. For this reason, sociobiology is often said to deal with "ultimate" causes of behavior, as such an analysis emphasizes behavior patterns or predispositions that are transmitted genetically across generations. In other words, like any other evolutionary biologist, the sociobiologist is interested in phylogenetic change, that change which can be observed in a species over long periods of time. Psychologists, whose observational parameters extend to the life of a single organism, are accustomed to observing and recording change over time periods measured in minutes, hours, or days. Thus by focussing on ontogenetic change, at the level of the individual organism, psychologists are described as dealing with "proximate" causes of behavior (Barash, 1982) .
The above distinction is an important one because the variables that govern phylogenetic change may not be the same as those responsible for ontogenetic change, and the sociobiologist, well-suited to entertain the former, is less inclined to reflect upon the latter. The reverse is true, of course, for the psychologist, who is not accustomed to tracing a behavior pattern through many generations of a species to ascertain its adaptiveness. On balance, the psychologist is disposed to consider the possible proximate functions of behavior in a given individual. It will be presently argued that these proximate functions unfold in the life of the individual organism through a variation and selection sequence similar to that characterizing biological evolution. Moreover, it will be shown that this functional similarity has in fact been acknowledged by psychologists of varying theoretical persuasions and over the course of more than 40 years. Thus, although evolutionary psychology and sociobiology are often credited with introducing evolutionary ideas into psychological science, such concepts, though perhaps incompletely articulated or appreciated, have long been part of the intellectual character of the discipline.
Selectionism in Cognitive Psychology
Among the contemporary infusions of evolutionary thinking in psychology is the current trend toward viewing cognition from a decidedly functional viewpoint. One is even tempted to suggest that modern cognitive psychology has rediscovered William James and functionalism, as much is currently being written about the "mind" in operation. What does this marvelous apparatus do for the average human being busying about in a real world populated by other human beings, computers, books, traffic jams, grocery stores, little league baseball, and courtroom drama? What are its essential functioning properties and limitations? And at a more "ultimate" level, how have these functional predilections served to promote our past survival? How might certain cognitive "biases" or dispositions have been selected for in our species' past? The questions are important, for they show a concern not only for cognition as something that aids the organism in dealing with a complex world, but as well a certain impatience for laboratory tasks bearing little resemblance to the thinking that a human being must do in a natural environment. Ecological themes have in fact become increasingly common in contemporary research in both cognitive science and social psychology (Lewontin, 1990; Neisser, 1985; Shlechter & Toglia, 1985) .
It is not necessary, however, to survey modern cognitive psychology to find evolutionary concepts at work in illuminating the thinking brain. A focus on adaptation at the level of the individual organism was a central feature of Piaget's theory of cognitive development. This fact is not surprising when one considers that Piaget received his formal education in biology. For Piaget, the evolution of a thinking human being paralleled in many ways the morphological adaptation of a species. Thus, he defined intelligence as "the form of equilibrium towards which the successive adaptations and exchanges between the organism and his environment are directed" (Piaget, 1950, p. 6) . The ongoing differentiation and evolution of individual schemas signal the attainment of intellectual milestones, examples of which are numerous in Piaget's thorough observational descriptions. Consider the following account of Piaget's son, Laurent, establishing a secondary circular reaction, among the early achievements within the sensorimotor period:
Laurent grasps a paper knife which he sees for the first time; he looks at it a moment and then swings it while holding it in his right hand. During these movements the object happens to rub against the wicker of the bassinet: Laurent then waves his arm vigorously and obviously tries to reproduce the sound he has heard. (Piaget, 1952, p. 168-169) The essence of the circular reactions is the discovery that one's behavior can bring about changes in the world at large. One can hardly envision a more dramatic occurrence for the human newborn, whose relative lack of mobility remains a significant restriction. In both the above and numerous other writings, Piaget seems to describe Laurent's initial behavior as largely random in nature; nondirected, spontaneous movements which, ultimately, produce an effect of which the child takes note, resulting eventually in repetition of the movement. The fact that the circular reaction is recognized as such indicates that it has become a somewhat stereotyped, predictable movement. Thus it becomes tempting to view the schema as an integrative unit of behavior selected from a larger universe of initially undifferentiated activities because of its utility to the organism in its present environment. Moreover, the evolution of a schema by way of selection (reinforcement) strongly resembles the operant response classes of Skinner's radical behaviorism.
A selection process is also evident in the cognitive literatures on hypothesis testing and problem solving. Marvin Levine (1966 Levine ( , 1970 , for instance, proposed a theory of discrimination learning which posits that a subject forms hypotheses about the "correct" dimension of a discrimination problem:
(a) The subject begins a learning task with a universe of hypotheses from which he draws one. This hypothesis dictates his response. (b) When the subject is told 'right' after a response, he keeps his hypothesis for the next trial. (c) When he is told 'wrong' he returns his hypothesis to the set and randomly draws a new one. (p. 397) Similarly, Newell and Simon (1972) , in their seminal work, Human Problem Solving, describe how a subject working a cryptarithmetic problem generates several potential responses, then weighs the apparent consequences of these different actions:
Even before he arrived at these difficulties, however, he did retreat from this strategy and introduced a certain amount of less selective search. When his initial processing of columns 2 and 6 did not lead to a precise value for G or F, he decided to try different possible solutions (forward search). As we have seen, he only did so to a very limited extent. His initial trial led to a blind alley. He then divided his exploration into two cases. (pp. 228-229) 
Selectionism in Biological Psychology and Neuroscience
It is fitting that scientists studying brain-behavior relationships might also incorporate selection concepts into their explanatory frameworks. This has in fact been the case, particularly with respect to the work of Edelman (1987) and Calvin (1987) . What is unique about their writings, however, is the application of selectionist thinking not in the service of explaining speciation, a phylogenetic phenomenon to which selection accounts have always been relevant, but rather to the moment-tomoment transactions between the functioning organism and its environment. It is this ontogenetic level of analysis that has always characterized psychological analysis, but to which evolutionary thinking has seldom been applied. Thus, it is fascinating to read Calvin's (1987) description of the brain as a virtual "Darwin Machine":
And, for at least a century, it has been known that even the highest-known biological function, human thought, involves random generation of many alternatives and is only shaped up into something of quality by a series of selections. Like elegant eyes and ears produced by biological randomness, the Darwin Machine's final product (whether sentence or scenario, algorithm or allegory) no longer appears random because of so many millisecond-long generations of selection shaping up alternative sequences off line. (p. 34)
Behavior Change as a Selection Process: Campbell and Skinner
Within psychology proper, perhaps the most conspicuous and explicit attempts to view behavior as moment-to-moment adaptation at the level of the individual organism is to be found in the writings of Donald Campbell and B. F. Skinner. In 1960, Campbell first proposed his "blind variation-andselective retention" model of behavior. One of his contentions was that such a process could account for both simple and complex behavior across an impressive array of species. Indeed, the very action of moving about successfully in one's environment depends, according to Campbell, on the continuous emission of random movements, some of which prove more advantageous to the organism. Consider, for example, the following description of exploratory locomotion in the protozoa:
Forward locomotion persists until blocked , at which point direction of locomotion is varied blindly until unblocked forward locomotion is again possible. The external physical environment is the selection agency, the preservation of discovery is embodied in the preservation of the unblocked forward movement. (p. 382) The model is not, however, envisioned as being limited to explanations of overt behavior in simple organisms. In defending the essence of trial-and-error learning theories against the criticisms of the Gestalt school, Campbell offered the blind variation and selective retention process as an equally powerful description of higher cognition:
At this level there is a substitute exploration of a substitute representation of the environment, the 'solution' being selected from the multifarious exploratory thought trials according to a criterion which is in itself substituting for an external state of affairs. (p. 384)
The above quotation is remarkable in its similarity to neurobiologist Calvin's (1987) description of the "Darwin Machine" some thirty years later! It is important also to note that the similarity between the two views is strictly functional. There is nothing in either account to suggest the specific neurological architecture responsible for this process.
Predating even Campbell's (1960) "variation and selective retention" model, Skinner (1953) first made explicit the similarity between natural selection and behavioral selection by means of operant conditioning:
In both operant conditioning and the evolutionary selection of behavioral characteristics, consequences alter future probability. Reflexes and other innate patterns of behavior evolve because they increase the chances of survival of the species. Operants grow strong because they are followed by important consequences in the life of the individual. (p. 90)
The theme would become a recurrent one in Skinner's writings throughout the last three decades of his life (Richelle, 1987; Skinner, 1966 Skinner, , 1981 . He would, in fact, eventually come to envision three levels at which selection operates, all having implications for behavior. Biological evolution, representing the normative level at which selectionist thinking has always been applied, would account for speciation and morphological diversity both between and within species. Phylogenetic selection can, of course, make substantial contributions to behavior as well as morphology, particularly in the form of species-specific behavior patterns. Behavioral adaptation, manifested within the lifespan of the individual organism, consists of those more local changes in behavior due to learning that have historically defined the behavioral sciences. Finally, social and cultural practices, though defined ordinarily at the group level, may also be susceptible to differential selective pressures. In sum, Skinner was convinced that selection represented a fundamental mechanism, accounting for a wide domain of natural phenomena.
Moreover, Skinner insisted that an account of an organism behaving need not make recourse to intention or volition any more than the process of biological evolution could be said to be guided by forethought or intelligent design:
Very often we attribute purpose to behavior as another way of describing its biological adaptability . . . A spider does not possess the elaborate behavioral repertoire with which it constructs a web because that web will enable it to capture the food it needs to survive. It possesses this behavior because similar behavior on the part of spiders in the past has enabled them to capture the food they needed to survive ... We are wrong in saying that we observe the 'purpose' of the web when we observe similar events in the life of the individual. (Skinner, 1953, p. 90) Impediments to Selectionist Thought in Psychology There would, thus, appear to be ample reason to claim selectionist thinking as a conceptual device of some perseverance in psychological science. One should take seriously the force of an idea that germinates under such variable intellectual conditions. That independent thinkers espousing such disparate world views as represented within cognitive, developmental, and behavioral psychology, would, nonetheless, be struck by the selectionist nature of ontogenetic change is remarkable.
And yet it is clear that selectionist thinking has failed to gain the sort of disciplinary foothold one might expect of such a potentially unifying concept. A cursory perusal of any major reference work or standard introductory textbook will reveal psychological thought to be dominated by the standard and familiar metatheories: psychodynamic, biological, behavioral, cognitive, and, perhaps, humanistic. And if psychology is indeed in a theoretical "crisis," why has not a unifying theory emerged? More specifically, how is it that selectionism could have remained dormant despite its promises having been sung for more than 40 years by such eminent scientists as Campbell, Piaget and Skinner? No doubt the somewhat perplexing fate of selectionist thought might be traceable to any number of factors, methodological, theoretical, or political, within the larger psychological community. Among these, however, two seem especially salient and worthy of discussion. First, as has been stated before, psychologists may, for many reasons, be reticent to incorporate evolutionary thinking into behavioral explanations. Second, and perhaps of greater importance, the conventional hypothesis testing, large group research designs so familiar to psychologists may be especially ill suited to capture adequately a dependent variable like behavioral adaptation across time.
Reluctance to Adopt Evolutionary Concepts
It is perhaps inevitable that, as scientific disciplines become increasingly specialized, the prospects for cross-fertilization and broadened scholarship might diminish. Any psychologist who dares to read an abstract of an empirical article outside his or her area of expertise will instantly be reminded of how insular psychological science has become. And if one can hardly be expected anymore to be a generalist within psychology, possessing a basic awareness of our field's multifarious theoretical and empirical activity, how might it be expected that psychologists would avail themselves also of relevant biological knowledge? Of course, it is not being claimed that psychologists have no understanding of those biological facts most conspicuously related to behavior. Indeed, the neurosciences, and the study of brain-behavior relationships in general, have done much to bring about the recent ascendence of the biological perspective in psychology.
And yet the study of brain-behavior relationships is entirely sensible for it represents a focus on proximate causation, and is thus consistent with the conventional analytic scope of psychological investigation. Adoption of an evolutionary stance, however, shifts the analysis to events not limited to the lifespan of the individual, and is therefore troublesome for the psychologist attempting to explain or influence behavior at this level.
Nevertheless, it has been presently argued that several notable attempts have been made to incorporate evolutionary thinking into the subject matter of psychology, and to do so even at an ontogenetic level. It is this latter suggestion that renders significant the writings of Piaget, Campbell, Skinner, and Levine, for the selective process being invoked is a proximate one, accounting for the organism's behavior across the lifespan. This focus is complementary to that offered by the evolutionary psychologist or sociobiologist, whose intent is to explain current behavior as a manifestation of phylogenetic contingencies operating over much longer time periods.
Methodological Rigidity
Those of us who grew up intellectually in psychology have come to accept as given certain features of the discipline, among them the way that psychologists conduct research. Indeed, the hallmark of the scientific method, as understood by psychologists, is so uniformly perceived as to become standard fare in much of our literature, particularly the introductory textbooks most often responsible for introducing the college student to the discipline of psychology. More often than not, the student's first exposure to psychology as a research discipline will entail obligatory discussions of experimental and correlational designs, experimental and control groups, descriptive and inferential statistics, and the general logic of Fisherian null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) as the model of science endorsed by psychological researchers.
Consistently absent from such portrayals is the acknowledgment that large group NHST designs are of relatively recent origin in the history of science, are not embraced as THE model of science outside of psychology and the behavioral sciences, and played virtually no role in the early development of psychology as an experimental science. Moreover, contemporary methodologists, whom one would assume to be sympathetic to the NHST method, have become increasingly vocal about the limitations of Fisherian designs applied to the kinds of questions of interest to psychologists. There has emerged, for example, a considerable literature addressing such problems as the appropriateness of the null hypothesis as a decision criterion, the distinction between alpha levels and effect size, an inordinate focus on Type I error as opposed to Type II error, the distinction between statistical reliability and clinical significance, the importance of establishing generality through replication, and so on (e.g., Cohen, 1990 Cohen, , 1994 da Prato, 1992; Haase, Ellis, & Ladany, 1989; Harcum, 1990; Huitema, 1986; Sohn, 1993) . One is left with the indelible impression that, from the standpoint of scientific method, psychology's house is not in order. At the very least, the current discontent would seem to call into question the plausibility of the NHST model as a comprehensive prescription for any science.
Among the claims associated with a Kuhnian perspective of science is that the conduct of scientific research is influenced, albeit unwittingly, by the investigator's world view, or conceptualization of the subject matter. This pronouncement has interesting repercussions for psychology, as it invites us to come to terms with how we define the essential elements of our subject matter and, importantly, how best to pursue this subject matter scientifically. It is to be presently argued that the method commonly embraced by psychologists is poorly suited to answer the kinds of questions most frequently posed by the behavioral scientist. Indeed, the nearly doctrinaire acceptance of group design and null hypotheSiS testing by psychologists is all the more unfortunate, for it implies that no reasonable alternatives exist for the meaningful collection and analysis of behavioral data. This is, of course, decidedly false. A distinct methodological variant, strongly reminiscent of the experimental method of the natural sciences, has both a formidable history in psychology and a prestigious cadre of proponents and supporters.
Single-Subject Research and the Natural Science of Behavior
It is a curious fact that the research programs carried out by many of psychology's most distinguished scholars seldom inform lectures on research methodology in psychology. Upon inspection, some of our discipline's most significant empirical contributions seem to have emerged from rather unorthodox methodological practices, including a nearly scandalous disregard for sample size. An abbreviated list of pioneers who apparently fretted little over small samples would include such luminaries as Ebbinghaus, Pavlov, Piaget, Newell and Simon, and Skinner. Moreover, these scientists secured their place in the history of psychology without the aid of the t test, multiple regression, and other statistical machinery portrayed by contemporary methodologists as indispensable to psychology as a research science.
The scientific study of behavior did not evolve simultaneously with the development of the sophisticated statistical techniques we associate today with psychological research. As Boring (1929) has made so clear, experimental psychology began as a branch of physiological science, as early scientists sought to establish how the functioning of the nervous system contributed to the action of the organism as a whole. These early endeavors were as sophisticated in method and instrumentation as the technology of their day allowed. Manipulation of independent variables, elimination of extraneous variables, and quantitatively precise measurement were seen even then as the hallmarks of good science. For these early psychologists, however, as for most contemporary natural scientists, quantitative analysis consisted of veridical measurement of one's subject matter and the fitting of empirical data to mathematical equations. It did not, as it does to psychologists of today, refer to the practices of null hypothesis testing and statistical inference.
There is ample reason for approaching behavior from a natural science perspective. In a fascinating account of his development as a scientist, Skinner (1956) traced his philosophy of method to a researcher whose meticulous laboratory work produced a Nobel prize in physiology. "So far as I can see, I began simply by looking for lawful processes in the behavior of the intact organism ... I had the clue from Pavlov: control your conditions and you will see order." (p. 224). And see order he did! But doing so meant abandoning the group designs and statistical analyses that were, during the 1930s and 1940s, redefining the scientific enterprise for students of behavior. Against the institutional popularity of large group research strategies, Skinner and a small band of fellow workers argued that the kinds of functional relationships of most interest to behavioral scientists were often obscured by group averages:
Another accident rescued me from mechanized statistics and brought me back to an even more intensive concentration on the single case. In essence, I suddenly found myself face to face with the engineering problem of the animal trainer. When you have the responsibility of making absolutely sure that a given organism will engage in a given sort of behavior at a given time, you quickly grow impatient with theories of learning. Principles, hypotheses, theorems, satisfactory proof at the .05 level of significance that behavior at a choice point shows the effect of secondary reinforcement-nothing could be more irrelevant. (Skinner, 1956, p. 228) Undoubtedly, a focus on the individual organism appeared, during the middle decades of this century, out of place in a discipline increasingly dominated by Fisherian designs. For this reason, singlesubject researchers encountered difficulty getting their work published in major psychological journals. Consequently, Skinner and his colleagues felt it necessary to found a separate outlet, the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior (JEAB), in 1958. Although this periodical has for almost four decades been the predominant forum for research in operant psychology, this is not the journal's distinguishing feature. What makes JEAB unique among psychological journals is its steadfast commitment to single-subject research. Indeed, papers submitted to JEAB must present data from individual organisms, regardless of the theoretical or methodological predilections driving the research (Zeiler, 1977) . Implicit in JEAB's publication policy is a core assumption about the subject matter of psychological science and the proper degree of resolution to be employed in its investigation. Clearly the founders of the journal were claiming that there is something fundamental about the unfolding relationship between an organism and its environment, and that observational strategies that obscure this dynamic are inimical to good behavioral science.
In sharp contrast to this focus on the single organism, the central datum in much psychological research is the group mean. This measure is a quantitative abstraction utilized both for its summaritive properties and its compatibility with parametric statistical analyses, not because it represents any essential dimension of behavior. Moreover, the sorts of inferences that can be drawn legitimately from such data are limited. Specifically, in such studies the proper direction of inference is from sample means to population means, not sample means to individuals. This lesson, encountered early in one's statistical education, is apparently forgotten in the classroom, where, pressed to identify the implications of psychological research, we offer recommendations concerning therapy, parenting strategies, and other applied interventions to circumstances of an inherently idiothetic nature. Seldom discussed in this context is the fact that the studies to which we refer in support of our recommendations are often characterized by substantial within-group variance. I often attempt to demonstrate the informational poverty of group means to my classes by simply reporting a class mean following an exam. Naturally, students find this information of scarce utility. Their immediate desire, quite understandably, is to know what their personal score was, not how a theoretically "average" student fared. Only in the case of a score variance approaching zero would this descriptive statistic convey the kind of information likely to be viewed as important within this context. Johnston and Pennypacker (1980) have aptly identified the limitations necessarily imposed by the conventional measurement strategies of psychological science:
The methods of experimental design and analysis introduced by Fisher are equally suited to the purposes for which they were developed-population genetics, agricultural research , and industrial quality control. In these areas, the individual case, be it fruit fly, ear of corn, or light bulb, is of little concern, and descriptions of population characteristics in terms of means and standard deviations are more than adequate for the inferences that group experimentation permits . . . To be sure, there are also valid applications of these procedures to certain problems in psychology and education. Large-scale educational evaluation, for example, is not concerned with whether and why a particular procedure is effective with a particular child, only with its effects on a population of children taken as a whole. The former is a behavioral question, whereas the latter is an actuarial one; it should not be expected that methods appropriate for one class of questions would apply to the other. (Johnston & Pennypacker, 1980, p. 91) Group designs are also frequently characterized by severe limitations in the number of dependent measures that can reasonably be acquired. More often than not, for both procedural and statistical reasons, group means are calculated on the basis of one or two observations of the variable. Even in those cases where repeated measures are taken, the number seldom exceeds more than a handful of observations. The reason for this sparsity of measurement is obvious. When you are required to collect data on large samples of subjects, the logistics of doing so repeatedly, and over potentially long observation periods, become daunting. There are, in addition, complexities of a statistical nature that become rapidly compounded with additional measures.
The practice of calculating group averages is not problematic so long as one conceives of the subject matter at that level of abstraction. But there exists in psychology no recognizable mandate for defining the behavioral atom in this way; nor should it be assumed that observation at such levels allows for confident statements about behavioral processes. After all, the development of measurement strategies in science is not an entirely haphazard enterprise. It is, rather, an adaptive, problem solving process which leads, ideally, toward more refined and accurate means of understanding one's subject matter. A key feature of this process is the degree to which the nature of the subject matter places restrictions on, or at the very least, guides efforts at instrument development and implementation. The advent of the microscope, for example, was necessitated by the existence of a natural world simply beyond the resolving capacity of the human optical system. The microscope's development was of significance largely because it rendered a previously inaccessible natural domain open to scientific study. As such, it represents a successful adaptation in scientific instrumentation driven by, and consequently appreciative of, the physical parameters of the subject matter. Can the same be said confidently of psychology and its related disciplines? Not, it seems, if one attaches meaning to contemporary proclamations that psychology is the scientific study of behavior and mental processes. Such processes are, by their very nature, extended in both space and time, and any measurement strategy incapable of capturing this quality would seem ill-suited to its purported task:
Behavior is a continuous process, changing through time as a function of the influence of its determining variables ... Quantitative description of behavior ... must be sensitive to this dynamic property and must be essentially continuous. Further, a crucial facet of the subject matter of the science of behavior concerns the nature of this change over time, and that nature cannot be understood unless the phenomenon is tracked through time. (Johnston & Pennypacker, 1980, p. 92) A distinguishing feature of the single-subject method is its reliance on repeated dependent variable measures. In the typical single-subject experiment, hundreds or even thousands of measures may be obtained from a single organism during the course of an experiment. This practice is not conceived of as measurement overkill, but simply befitting a subject matter that is continuous and known to vary systematically over time as a function of numerous independent variables. Additionally, this research strategy is in keeping with the spirit of selectionist thought, which conceptualizes behavior as moment-to-moment adaptation. Such an epistemology renders the atemporal, discontinuous measurement scheme of traditional behavioral science inappropriate, as it fails to circumscribe the essential property of the presumed subject matter. And perhaps it is for this very reason that a selectionist account has failed as yet to win adherents as a major psychological metatheory. However much psychologists might offer conceptual or theoretical descriptions of behavior as a continuous, time-dependent phenomenon, the standard methods of psychological science have seldom made adequate contact with this dimension of behavior.
Lessons from the Masters
For behavior analysts, the single-subject epistemology is most strongly associated with Murray Sidman (1960) and Skinner, both of whom were vocal and articulate proponents of the research strategy. But operant psychologists were neither the first to use nor the only psychologists to sing the praises of the method. Indeed, perhaps the purist practitioner of the single-subject method was Ebbinghaus (1885), whose research on human memory broke important ground for psychology as a young science. In addition to contributing important empirical findings, Ebbinghaus demonstrated the plausibility of subjecting the "associative processes" of philosophers to controlled, laboratory analysis (Bower & Hilgard, 1981) . It is all the more impressive that Ebbinghaus' basic findings regarding human memory remain, for the most part, unchallenged more than a century after their original publication (Schultz & Schultz, 1992) . Will today's empirical discoveries, the product of more advanced instrumentation and statistical analysis, prove equally durable?
Pavlov, too, was by all accounts a meticulous experimenter, and the data reported in the classic Conditioned Reflexes (1927) are, without exception, from individual organisms. Pavlov's procedure was, of course, burdensome, requiring a surgical technique, thus rendering large sample research by contemporary standards simply unreasonable. And yet, once again, the functional relationships uncovered by Pavlov are little contested today, though their interpretation has been informed both by contemporary learning theory and advances in neuroscience.
Finally, consider Piaget, whose theory of intellectual development remains influential despite modern revisions and contemporary research. Being biologically trained, Piaget apparently felt little compulsion to conduct his observations of children according to statistical methods. This is not to say that Piaget was not mindful of the need for methodological rigor. Indeed, a reading of his work will reveal him to have been an accomplished Popperian scientist. Piaget entertained explanations of his subjects' behavior with reluctance, and constantly manipulated his problem tasks in a programmatic way in order to rule out alternative explanations. This falsificationist approach, implemented at the level of individual subjects, served both him and us, in hindsight, quite well. Are we the poorer for the fact that his analyses were not couched in terms of significance levels?
Whatever their personal histories, academic credentials, and theoretical biases, Ebbinghaus, Pavlov, Piaget, and Skinner found common ground in the study of individual organisms. Their collective assumption, whether explicitly articulated or not, was that there is value in studying how an organism deals with the moment by moment vicissitudes of the surrounding world, and that this continuous interplay is often hidden by traditional group designs. Single-subject designs, by their very nature, entail frequent intrasubject and intersubject replications, thereby establishing the reliability of a behavioral phenomenon. Indeed, both Sidman (1960) and Cohen (1994) have argued that the generality of any behavioral phenomenon is best established not by large samples, but through replication and programmatic study of individuals.
Conclusion
It is here argued that methodological orthodoxy within scientific psychology has limited our ability to effectively address behavior as a continuous phenomenon, despite the fact that the most important conceptual and theoretical treatments have often alluded to the relevance of variation and selection in the development of behavior. Nevertheless, selectionist thought has failed to carry the day as an influential model for explaining behavior. Though perhaps attributable to several factors, this state of affairs likely reflects the restrictions our methods place on the kinds of questions we ask about behavior. At some point in our history, a research tactic proving useful for evaluating crop yields was seen as a promising candidate for behavioral science as well. One wonders whether, in the apparent excitement of the moment, any attention was paid to how well these new research designs would map onto behavioral phenomena. The argument here being made is that the Fisherian research tradition has proved counterproductive for psychology, especially in regards to its nearly universal endorsement as THE "scientific method" within the discipline. Among the possible consequences of endorsing such designs is a contemporary milieu within which sophisticated statistical analyses have become a defining feature of psychological research, rather than a tool to be used as part of a larger enterprise. Moreover, the current emphasis on data analysis, particularly in the form of involved multivariate procedures, may serve, ironically, to divert attention away from behavior as a subject matter. One wonders whether the bells and whistles of user-friendly computerized statistical packages might be serving as methodological blinders among contemporary psychologists? Are we more likely to be asking questions about alpha levels and statistical power than whether "a given organism will engage in a given sort of behavior at a given time" (Skinner, 1956, p. 228) ? If so, future discussions regarding disciplinary unification can ill afford to ignore the fact that, in psychological science, the tail too often wags the dog!
